Old Hardware Emulated: The Palm LifeDrive
The LifeDrive Ended Up On Life Support Instead
As the 2000's
continued, the Palm handhelds continued to lose their appeal. The Treo
devices remained high sellers. However, the profit margins of these
handhelds tended to be lower as they were geared towards the general
consumers. Palm had made numerous attempts to gain a foothold into the
lucrative corporate market, but to no avail.
In 2005, Palm made yet another attempt into the corporate market with the LifeDrive. This device was geared towards power users who wanted corporate features while still having that recreational handheld capable of music and video playback. Palm defined this market as the "prosumer" market, as ridiculous as that word is (Is the phrase "power user" is too generic? ). The power user market (if one exist) is typically defined as one where the user wants all the general purpose features of a given handheld while still needing more powerful features. For example, IT workers would connect to network resources using their WinCE handhelds or Medical workers using their PDA's to connect to databases. Essentially, the power-user market is basically the middle ground between home/casual and corporate users. In order to appeal to this market, Palm coined the equally ridiculous "Mobile Manager" moniker.
One would be given the impression that Palm simply grabbed random corporate buzzwords when creating labels for the power-user market to give the impression that their devices have an edge. Could their LifeDrive live up to the "Mobile Manager" market that it was geared towards?
The LifeDrive was different in that instead of using compact flash, the OS and applications were loaded on a 4GB microdrive hard-disk. The reason for this is that their was no compact flash memory available at the time that had the large enough capacity at the price point that Palm wanted to sell the device for ($499).
In 2005, Palm made yet another attempt into the corporate market with the LifeDrive. This device was geared towards power users who wanted corporate features while still having that recreational handheld capable of music and video playback. Palm defined this market as the "prosumer" market, as ridiculous as that word is (Is the phrase "power user" is too generic? ). The power user market (if one exist) is typically defined as one where the user wants all the general purpose features of a given handheld while still needing more powerful features. For example, IT workers would connect to network resources using their WinCE handhelds or Medical workers using their PDA's to connect to databases. Essentially, the power-user market is basically the middle ground between home/casual and corporate users. In order to appeal to this market, Palm coined the equally ridiculous "Mobile Manager" moniker.
One would be given the impression that Palm simply grabbed random corporate buzzwords when creating labels for the power-user market to give the impression that their devices have an edge. Could their LifeDrive live up to the "Mobile Manager" market that it was geared towards?
The LifeDrive was different in that instead of using compact flash, the OS and applications were loaded on a 4GB microdrive hard-disk. The reason for this is that their was no compact flash memory available at the time that had the large enough capacity at the price point that Palm wanted to sell the device for ($499).
The website for the
LifeDrive has been preserved on Archive.orgs' Wayback Machine. One gets
a glimpse to all the features that were supported by the LifeDrive. It
seemed like a very compelling handheld on the surface. It had a 416MHz
ARM processor, which was very good for the time. It also had 64MB's of
RAM and a SD card slot, making the handheld very expandable. It had
compatibility with the MS-Office formats via Documents To Go along with a
built-in MP3 player, image viewer, and support for email. The storage
drive could hold up too 300 songs or enough battery to support two hours
of video playback. One could watch a few episodes of Friends (when
re-encoded) on this handheld before it needed to be recharged.
Where these
features that revolutionary though? MP3 playback was considered standard
now. The iPod showed millions of users the world over that they could
carry their entire music library on the go. Not only that, the WinCE
handhelds have already supported MP3 playback for several years already.
Video playback was still largely considered a novelty, albeit, not one
that would last much longer. Email, Bluetooth, JPG/GIF/PNG image
support, and web-browsing was quite standard as well. Granted, in 2004,
web surfing on a PDA wasn't quite universal yet. The Internet on PDA's
was still a novelty, like video playback. However, web-surfing on mobile
handhelds was exploding, especially on the Nokia devices running
Symbian. Expectations were rapidly changing.
The LifeDrive was being drowned in a ocean flooded with various competitors. On the low-end, various flip-phones from Nokia loaded with Symbian and the J2ME Java interpreter were rapidly taking over. On one hand, their screens were typically much smaller than that of a PDA. However, they generally supported the same features for a much lower price point.
On the high-end, the various WinCE and Blackberry handhelds were making mincemeat of Palm's offerings. They typically had faster processors, more RAM, and more security features, which made them a no-brainer for corporate users. Microsoft and RIM understood the needs of corporate users much better than Palm did.
This market split rapidly exposed the flaws of the demographic that the LifeDrive was trying to cater too. Their never was that middle-ground market that Palm was chasing (or trying to create). Most power-users who needed those extra features simply spent the extra money and brought the same handhelds that corporate users embraced. Other could also buy these handhelds second-hand from eBay, further eroding the demand for the LifeDrive. Those who could do without advance features simply brought the more affordable offerings from Nokia.
Not only that, the LifeDrive had its own set of technical problems as well. The microdrive is still a hard-drive after all. It's has the same components as a standard desktop hard-drive, but greatly scaled down. It's not a solid state drive, and thus, doesn't have the same performance associated with such a drive. Loading programs, video, and music took significantly longer on a LifeDrive compared to various other handhelds. This alone wouldn't have been a issue if this was geared towards the low-end. Yet, the market that the LifeDrive was catering to demanded a high-speed storage solution. A microdrive simply wasn't going to cut it.
Since the microdrive was still a hard-drive, it was also prone to the same degrading that a standard hard-disk encounters. That meant that a hard-drive that wasn't that fast to begin with would only get worse in time before crashing. Solid-state solutions have a significantly longer life expectancy simply because such media doesn't have moving, mechanical parts. Also, the microdrive puts a heavier load on the battery compared to an solid state drive.
In time, it was possible to replace that microdrive with a 4GB compact flash card, which greatly improved both performance and battery life. However, this really didn't change the LifeDrive's fortunes, or lack thereof. It was taken off the shelves in the UK because it used hazardous materials. Not a great selling point if you ask me. Also, due to its higher price, advances in flash memory, and the general march of Moore's Law, the LifeDrive didn't fare well in the market, and it was discontinued on 2007.
The LifeDrive was being drowned in a ocean flooded with various competitors. On the low-end, various flip-phones from Nokia loaded with Symbian and the J2ME Java interpreter were rapidly taking over. On one hand, their screens were typically much smaller than that of a PDA. However, they generally supported the same features for a much lower price point.
On the high-end, the various WinCE and Blackberry handhelds were making mincemeat of Palm's offerings. They typically had faster processors, more RAM, and more security features, which made them a no-brainer for corporate users. Microsoft and RIM understood the needs of corporate users much better than Palm did.
This market split rapidly exposed the flaws of the demographic that the LifeDrive was trying to cater too. Their never was that middle-ground market that Palm was chasing (or trying to create). Most power-users who needed those extra features simply spent the extra money and brought the same handhelds that corporate users embraced. Other could also buy these handhelds second-hand from eBay, further eroding the demand for the LifeDrive. Those who could do without advance features simply brought the more affordable offerings from Nokia.
Not only that, the LifeDrive had its own set of technical problems as well. The microdrive is still a hard-drive after all. It's has the same components as a standard desktop hard-drive, but greatly scaled down. It's not a solid state drive, and thus, doesn't have the same performance associated with such a drive. Loading programs, video, and music took significantly longer on a LifeDrive compared to various other handhelds. This alone wouldn't have been a issue if this was geared towards the low-end. Yet, the market that the LifeDrive was catering to demanded a high-speed storage solution. A microdrive simply wasn't going to cut it.
Since the microdrive was still a hard-drive, it was also prone to the same degrading that a standard hard-disk encounters. That meant that a hard-drive that wasn't that fast to begin with would only get worse in time before crashing. Solid-state solutions have a significantly longer life expectancy simply because such media doesn't have moving, mechanical parts. Also, the microdrive puts a heavier load on the battery compared to an solid state drive.
In time, it was possible to replace that microdrive with a 4GB compact flash card, which greatly improved both performance and battery life. However, this really didn't change the LifeDrive's fortunes, or lack thereof. It was taken off the shelves in the UK because it used hazardous materials. Not a great selling point if you ask me. Also, due to its higher price, advances in flash memory, and the general march of Moore's Law, the LifeDrive didn't fare well in the market, and it was discontinued on 2007.
The LifeDrive was
preloaded with PalmOS Garnet 5.4.8. This Palm SDK emulator has support
for the LifeDrive as well, so one could get a brief glimpse of what this
handheld was life.
Tungsten E2
The irony is that the LifeDrive wasn't totally geared towards the corporate market, but yet, it had features that the Tungsten line (which was geared towards such users) of PDA's didn't have, like built-in WIFI. It's also ironic that the Tungsten was priced at the same price point of their typical consumer offerings, despite it being targeted towards corporate users.
The Tungsten E2 shipped in 2005 with a Intel ARM processor running at 200MHz, 32MB's of memory, a 320 by 320 color display, and ran PalmOS Garnet. It was priced around $249. In a lot of ways, this felt like Palm going back to its roots by offering a very capable PDA for the everyman. Anyone saving some money from a couple of paychecks or doing a spontaneous splurge could have afforded this. The price was reduced shortly thereafter to $199.
The E2 did NOT have built in WIFI. WIFI came in the support of a extra peripheral that only supported WEP, not WPA or WPA2. This was seen taking a few steps back in security as both various WinCE and Blackberry handhelds supported these security protocols. The lack of WPA/WPA2 security greatly reduced the E2's appeal with corporate users, the market that the handheld was geared for.
Articles Of Interest
Palm Tungsten (Wikipedia) - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palm_Tungsten
Palm LifeDrive (Wikipedia) - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LifeDrive
Palm LifeDrive (Website, Archived on Wayback Machine) -https://web.archive.org/web/20050807231632/http://www.palm.com/us/landing/lifedrive_us.html/
Palm OS (Wikipedia) - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palm_OS
Tungsten E2
The irony is that the LifeDrive wasn't totally geared towards the corporate market, but yet, it had features that the Tungsten line (which was geared towards such users) of PDA's didn't have, like built-in WIFI. It's also ironic that the Tungsten was priced at the same price point of their typical consumer offerings, despite it being targeted towards corporate users.
The Tungsten E2 shipped in 2005 with a Intel ARM processor running at 200MHz, 32MB's of memory, a 320 by 320 color display, and ran PalmOS Garnet. It was priced around $249. In a lot of ways, this felt like Palm going back to its roots by offering a very capable PDA for the everyman. Anyone saving some money from a couple of paychecks or doing a spontaneous splurge could have afforded this. The price was reduced shortly thereafter to $199.
The E2 did NOT have built in WIFI. WIFI came in the support of a extra peripheral that only supported WEP, not WPA or WPA2. This was seen taking a few steps back in security as both various WinCE and Blackberry handhelds supported these security protocols. The lack of WPA/WPA2 security greatly reduced the E2's appeal with corporate users, the market that the handheld was geared for.
Articles Of Interest
Palm Tungsten (Wikipedia) - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palm_Tungsten
Palm LifeDrive (Wikipedia) - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LifeDrive
Palm LifeDrive (Website, Archived on Wayback Machine) -https://web.archive.org/web/20050807231632/http://www.palm.com/us/landing/lifedrive_us.html/
Palm OS (Wikipedia) - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palm_OS
Palm’s progress: The rise, fall—and rebirth—of a legendary brand - https://www.fastcompany.com/90246716/palms-progress-the-rise-fall-and-rebirth-of-a-legendary-brand
Palm: The Rise and Fall of a Legend - https://www.technobuffalo.com/palm-the-rise-and-fall-of-a-legend
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